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Abstract
We here present a model of the dynamics of extremism based on
opinion dynamics in order to understand the circumstances which
favour its emergence and development in large fractions of the general
public. Our model is based on the bounded confidence hypothesis
and on the evolution of initially anti-conformist agents to extreme po-
sitions. Numerical analyses demonstrate that a few anti-conformist
are able to drag a large fraction of conformists agents to their posi-
tion provided that they express their views more often than the con-
formists. The most influential parameter controlling the outcome of
the dynamics is the uncertainty of the conformist agents; the higher
their uncertainty, the higher is the influence of anti-conformists. Sys-
tematic scans of the parameter space show the existence of two regime
transitions, one following the conformists uncertainty parameter and
the other one following the anti-conformism strength.
Keywords: Extremism, opinion dynamics, bounded confidence,
clustering, anti-conformism.
1 Introduction
The present paper discusses the dynamics of extremism in a democratic set-
ting. A probably over-optimistic view of democracy is that when opinions are
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openly expressed, some consensus opinion would emerge and citizens would
vote in favour of a government whose actions would be in accordance with
the views of a large majority of citizens. This utopia is shared by many writ-
ers, but History has consistently shown us that National Consensus was a
dream, that could eventually occur at war time, not such a wishful situation.
At least one would expect that the elected government would be close
enough to a centrist position satisfying the largest proportion of citizens, as
the ice cream seller choosing to put his stand near the middle of a linear
beach (Hotelling (1990)).
Once again, History since the Eighteenth century Enlightenment period
in Western Europe contradicts these simple views and we are not observing a
smooth evolution towards more consensus nor towards the success of centrists
parties. We rather observed alternation between regimes of dominance of
centrists political parties and regimes of strong ideological fights between
more extremist parties, eventually leading to de facto dictatorship, according
to time periods and world regions. The present paper is an essay to model
possible evolutions of public opinions leading to different opinion aggregation
landscape forming the basis of political entities corresponding to parties. We
here develop a model of opinion dynamics in order to answer such questions
as:
• How come rational1 people choose extremism?
• How does an initial low proportion of anti-conformist influences/(or
does not), a large fraction of the general population to aggregate in
powerful extremist clusters?
• What characterises political clusters in terms of the number of agents
in the cluster and their distance to a middle opinion? More precisely
what are the regions in the parameter space of the model which would
lead the different outcome of the dynamics?
The simulations presented in this paper are based on opinion dynamics:
agents exchange their views on the occasion of encounters, and they might
update their opinion as a result of these exchanges. We are well aware that
opinion formation in politics involves many other processes than encounters
and discussions among individuals: media, political parties, the government
1rational here does not refer to economists’ full rationality but rather to its common
sense, people able to practice some form of reasoning
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and other political institutions are involved as well. For the sake of clarity,
we postpone the discussion of the robustness of our results with respect to
these other factors to the last section of the paper.
The earliest models of opinion dynamics were binary opinions models,
where opinions could take only two discrete values, e.g. -1 and +1 in the
so-called voters models as described in Holley & Liggett (1975),Galam et al.
(1982) and summarised in Castellano et al. (2009).
We here present a model based on continuous opinions, more adapted to
the discussion of the assets and liabilities of political choices among agents,
and to the traditional right/left axis of political analysts, than binary opin-
ions. It is inspired from two approaches, the bounded confidence model of
Deffuant et al. (2000) and the anti-conformism model of Smaldino & Epstein
(2015). Since these two models are used as building blocks of our model, we
will first summarise their main aspects.
The rest of the paper is then divided into 3 sections
• Short reminders of the previous models.
– Deffuant et al. (2000) bounded confidence model including its ap-
plication to extremism.
– Smaldino and Epstein model of anti-conformism.
• Our synthetic model is developed and its results presented.
• Conclusions and discussion.
Disclaimer
The present paper should not be interpreted as normative: we rather try
to describe the evolution of opinions and political choices. One can certainly
give examples such as Civil Rights in general, when initially considered ex-
tremist opinions were later largely accepted by the public. And other cases
in which the consequences of extremism turned out to be dramatic.
2 Essentials of former models
In order to achieve consistency in notations and hypotheses, we use our
own notation throughout the paper, which sometimes differ from those of
Deffuant et al. (2000) and Smaldino & Epstein (2015) and make appropriate
scale changes.
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2.1 Bounded confidence
The bounded confidence model is based on a major cognitive bias, the confir-
mation bias (Plous (1993)): we are mostly influenced by opinions close to ours
and tend to reject opinions too far away. The mathematical model was inde-
pendently introduced by Deffuant et al. (2000) and by Hegselmann & Krause
(2002). It follows the spirit of Axelrod’s earlier model of dissemination of cul-
tures. In Axelrod (1997) model, cultures are described by strings of integers.
Pairs of agents interact if their cultures are already close enough, in which
case one of them adjusts one feature of its culture string to match that of
the other agent’s culture.
In bounded confidence models, opinions are represented by real numbers.
When opinion differences are lower than a confidence threshold, agents ad-
just their opinion by decreasing such difference. In Deffuant et al. model,
pairs of agents are randomly chosen in the population of agents and they
eventually adjust their opinion if the confidence condition is met. Another
pair is randomly chosen, and so on. Such an iteration mode is called random
sequential.
By contrast Hegselmann & Krause (2002) apply the same opinion up-
dating equation but they use parallel iteration: all opinions are updated
simultaneously. Their choice is well adapted to discussions in committees for
instance.
We will consistently use random sequential iteration in this paper.
2.2 Deffuant et al. bounded confidence model
Deffuant et al. (2000) bounded confidence model was introduced to model
situations in which actors have to take decisions involving cost/benefit anal-
ysis in terms of money. Such was the case when the Common Agricultural
Policy was modified in 1992: farmers were proposed to change their former
practices in favour of more environment friendly practices, e.g. by reducing
fertilisers and pesticides use, in exchange for financial aid. But optimising
new practices involved a lot of financial uncertainties and surveys demon-
strated that farmers would have many social interactions discussing the pros
and the cons of the environmental contracts before taking any decision.
Deffuant et al. (2000) model can be simply described:
Opinions are represented by a continuous variable x.
Two randomly chosen agents with opinions x and x′ interact if, and only
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if, |x− x′| < u. Opinions are updated according to:
x = x+ µ · (x′ − x)
x′ = x′ + µ · (x− x′)
(1)
u represents the uncertainty of the agents, and µ, taken between 0 and
0.5, is a kinetic parameter. If the two initial opinions are close enough, the
two agents interact and their opinions move closer. Otherwise, no opinion
change occurs2.
X X’
u
Figure 1: Agents with initial positions x and x′ move there opinion closer to
each other opinion. The threshold for actual interaction u is interpreted as
a confidence or uncertainty parameter.
Simulations An initial distribution of agents opinions is first randomly
established. To achieve maximum randomness most authors choose a uniform
distribution on a segment. The first model of Deffuant used [0,1] as initial
segment. Later most authors used [-1,1] as initial segment which we do in
this paper for the sake of comparison.
At each time step, a random pair of agents is chosen, to which the above
described updating algorithm is applied.
Simulations are stopped after convergence of opinions into one or several
clusters.
2 Many extensions of the bounded confidence model were proposed as described in
the review of Castellano et al. (2009). Some take into account the possiblity of repulsion
among agents such Huet et al. (2008); Alizadeh et al. (2014): agents can be either at-
tracted for small differences in opinions, but can also have repulsive interaction when their
difference is larger than another upper thresold. Other models, Kurmyshev et al. (2011),
consider two populations of interacting agents, some having only attractive interaction,
others also having repulsive interactions.
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Results Opinions vs time plots, figure 2, represent opinion dynamics. Each
point on the graph represents the opinion of an individual agent along the
y axis at time t on the horizontal axis when the agent is tested for opinion
change. The time unit for all plots corresponds to 1000 pair updatings (on
average each agent is tested twice per time unit). Individual dots might
hardly be distinguished on these plots, but the envelope of the clouds gives
an indication of the gradual convergence of opinions in the course of time.
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Figure 2: Comparison of opinion dynamics for different uncertainties u. (u =
0.6 for the left plot, u = 0.4 for the right plot).
These two plots compare the evolution of opinions until convergence. The
number of agents is 1000, µ = 0.1, initial opinion uniformly and randomly
chosen on segment [-1,1]. Uncertainty u is 0.6 for the left plot and 0.4 for
the right plot. Time 150 correspond to sampling 150 pairs, so each agent has
been sampled for updating 300 times on average.
Deffuant et al. (2000) have shown that agents uncertainty u is the main
determinant of the outcome of the dynamics.
To summarise the results relevant to our analysis:
• Opinions are clustered in n = int( 1
u
) clusters which do not interact any
more after a long enough time (int stands for integer part).
• Clusters are of equal size and are at least 2u apart.
We will further refer to the above statements as the n = int( 1
u
) rule. The
general expression for an initial distribution of opinions on a segment of width
w is n = int( w
2u
).
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2.3 Deffuant et al. model of extremism
Deffuant et al. (2002) later proposed of model of extremism prevalence in-
spired from the bounded confidence model. Their extremism model bears
certain differences with the bounded confidence model, the most relevant for
us is the introduction of a small fraction of extremists in the agent pop-
ulation. Extremists are different from the other agents by having a very
low uncertainty and by having extreme opinions at the end of the spectrum
[−1, 1]. Deffuant et al. (2002) also added a dynamics on uncertainty: agents
not only exchange opinions but also uncertainty u.
The main issue in Deffuant et al. (2002) is whether the small fraction of
extremists is able to drag towards extremism the normal (centrist) agents
with initially larger uncertainty and extended distribution of opinions.
The initial fraction of extremists plays some role in the outcome of the
dynamics, but the most significant result is that the centrists uncertainty u
determines the outcome of the dynamics in large regions of parameters. For
narrow uncertainties, say u ≤ 0.4, a few perc. of centrists are dragged toward
extremism. For u ≃ 1 initially moderate agents are split in two opposed ex-
tremist fractions, and for u ≥ 1.4 most moderate agents are dragged towards
an asymmetric single extremist attractor, close to either -1 or +1.
This extremism model and the full set of results described in Deffuant et al.
(2002), and more recently in Deffuant (2006), show that extremists can con-
vert a large fraction of the population for the largest values of the centrist
uncertainty, even when their number is relatively small with respect to the
total population. What is missing is the reason why extremism first arises.
Deffuant et al. (2002) postulate the initial existence of some extremists in
the population from empirical observations of the political scene of most
countries, including democracies. The model by Smaldino & Epstein (2015)
provides a clue to the origin of extremism.
2.4 Anti-conformism generates extremism
Smaldino & Epstein (2015) recently introduced a model of anti-conformism
and its consequences on individual preferences: “Social Conformity Despite
Individual Preferences for Distinctiveness”. 3 The concept of distinctive-
ness plays a central role in several social psychological theories of self and
3 Their paper does not explicitely refer to politics but they quote several references
about politics.
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identity processes. In such framework, positions are most often taken in
multi-dimensional spaces. Since we here represent political opinions as con-
tinuous variables on a bounded support, the most distinctive opinions should
be those at the boundaries. The idea is that some political agents choose
anti-conformist attitudes to attract attention and get some prestige. The
process can be observed among political activists and we will further dis-
cuss in the conclusion section why some professional political agents choose
non-conformism or extreme positions.
In the Smaldino-Epstein model, instead of exchanging with other agents
to share common views, anti-conformist agents react to the distribution of
opinions (which they are supposed to be aware of) and they choose opinions
away from the average opinion of the other agents. Anti-conformists view as
ideal a position x∗ such that:
x∗ = xaver + δ · σ (2)
where xaver is the average opinion of the distribution, σ is the standard
deviation of the distribution and δ a kind of anti-conformist strength. Agents
then gradually update their opinion in the direction of x∗ according to:
x = x+ µ · (x∗ − x) (3)
Although anti-conformists wish to remain distinct from the crowd, since
they all share the same goal x∗ the variance of the distribution actually
decreases during each iteration by a factor 1− µ and they converge towards
a single attractor. Starting from an initial uniform distribution on segment
[-1,+1], for positive values of δ, the final opinion cluster is well above the
initial opinion average at σ0δ, where σ0 is the initial standard deviation. The
asymptotic opinion can then stand outside the initial opinion range for large
values of σ0δ.
In other words, anti-conformism4 results in convergence to more extreme
opinions than the initial average opinion, which makes the process a valuable
4Other authors have introduced anti-conformist agents in the simulation of binary
opinion dynamics Galam (2004); Jarman et al. (2015). In the context of binary opinions,
say 0 or 1, anti-conformists have opinions opposed to the opinion of their neighbours.
In the Smaldino & Epstein (2015) model as in the present paper, the anti-conformists
choose opinions further than those of other agents. Their position can be described
as ’plus royaliste que le Roi’ or in English ’more catholic than the Pope’. Hence, the
dynamics of ’our’ mixed population is quite different from those described in Galam (2004);
Jarman et al. (2015)
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hypothesis on the origin of extremism. Of course many other factors can play
a role, but we will here only investigate the importance of the anti-conformism
factor5.
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Figure 3: Anti-conformism generates extremism: evolution of opinions (red
dots) and of the standard deviation (green dots) for 1000 anti-conformist
agents with kinetic parameter µ = 0.1 and anti-conformist strength δ = 1.
3 The synthetic model
In the present synthetic model, two different populations of agents are intro-
duced:
• Conformists obeying a bounded confidence model as in Deffuant et al.
(2000). The conformists can be directly influenced by all individual
agents within their uncertainty range. Their opinions aggregate into
clusters.
5The Smaldino & Epstein (2015) paper covers more situations than reported here, in-
cluding heterogeneity of δ, the anti-conformist strength. It e.g. shows that the above
conclusions on convergence of the dynamics remain true provided that such heterogeneity
is limited: the standard deviation of the δ distribution should be less than 1.
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• Anti-conformists obeying the anti-conformist model of Smaldino & Epstein
(2015). The anti-conformists are only influenced by the local proper-
ties, average opinion and standard deviation of the agents’ opinion,
within their uncertainty range. As a result, they soon move towards
the exterior of the distribution of conformists.
Numerical simulations show that a large fraction of the conformists agents
also evolve towards extreme positions where they form extra clusters with
anti-conformists.
Let us stress the difference between the anti-conformists of the present
model and the extremists of Deffuant et al. (2002). In Deffuant et al. (2002),
the extremists have been given ab initio extreme positions and they are far
less susceptible to centrists attraction than the other agents. In the present
model, anti-conformists have the same initial opinion distribution than the
other agents. They evolve towards extreme positions because of their spe-
cific dynamics. They become little influenced by centrists when they get
close to their equilibrium position because meanwhile centrists opinions have
coalesced into clusters, thus reducing the standard deviation of their distribu-
tion. In other words, anti-conformists acquired a role similar to extremists.
By contrast, the attraction of conformists towards anti-conformist has been
identically maintained.
3.1 Model description
Two populations of conformists and anti-conformists co-exist and interact
according to the threshold condition. For any agent, anti-conformist or con-
formist, interactions only involve their neighbourhood, [x−u, x+u]. u is the
same for conformists and anti-conformists and specifies the interaction range
for both types of agents.
We start from a uniform initial distribution of agents opinions on the
[-1,+1] segment.
At each time step, one agent is first randomly selected.
If an anti-conformist were selected during the first draw, it interacts with
all the agents within the reach of its opinion [xe−u, xe+u] using the Smaldino-
Epstein algorithm, moving towards the local x∗. This happens with proba-
bility r where r is the fraction of anti-conformist agents. And that’s it for
the round.
If the first agent were a conformist, which happens with probability 1−r,
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a second agent is randomly selected and we apply the Deffuant algorithm.
In fact, if the second agent were an anti-conformist, only the conformist
moves towards the anti-conformist since anti-conformists are not involved in
binary interaction6. In other word, their only moves are those dictated by
the Smaldino-Epstein algorithm.
Figure 4 describes the tree of probabilities for one sampling round.
Co
Co
1−r
apply SE
apply BC
1+r(f−1)
1−r
1+r(f−1)
apply BC
A−Co
A−Co
rf
r
Figure 4: The tree of probabilities for one iteration step. A-Co stands for
anti-conformist agents and Co for conformists. The applied algorithms are
noted SE (resp. BC) for Smaldino Epstein (resp. for Bounded confidence).
Refer to the text for the computation of probabilities of each branch.
Since we here describe the political arena, we further add two more rules
for anti-conformists.
• Anti-conformists choose positions outside the crowd and as far as pos-
sible from the other party(ies); a simple implementation of this in-
clination is to choose positive (resp. negative) values of δ for anti-
conformists with positive opinion (resp. negative). This simple rejec-
6We have chosen not to move the anti-conformist, although the alternative choice, move
according to SE rule could have been made. Anyway, differences in behaviour between
the two choices would not have changed qualitatively the dynamics for our choice of
parameters.
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tion rule is only applied to anti-conformists7. Anti-conformist opinions
are only updated when the first draw was an anti-conformist.
• We take into account the fact that anti-conformists are more active
in propaganda than conformists. They express their opinion more of-
ten than conformists, whether in the streets or in the media (Bronner
(2013)). One extra parameter of the model is f the relative frequency
of opinion expression of anti-conformists with respect to the frequency
of expression of conformists. This is implemented in the model by
the fact that any anti-conformist is randomly selected for interaction f
times more often than any conformist.
Let us be more specific about the implementation of the second rule
concerning the second draw. Let r be the fraction of anti-conformist in the
population. Since any anti-conformist is selected f more often than any
conformist, anti-conformists are selected for interaction with a probability
proportional to rf . Conformists are selected with a probability proportional
to 1− r. Normalising probabilities to sum 1 implies to draw anti-conformists
with probability rf
1+r(f−1)
and conformists with probability 1−r
1+r(f−1)
.
3.2 Simulation results
Time plots and histograms Let us first compare time plots (fig. 4 and
6) and asymptotic histograms (fig. 5 and 7) of opinion dynamics, when one
changes the relative expression frequency parameter f from 1 to 20. The
following plots were drawn for an uncertainty level u = 0.3, anti-conformism
strength δ = 2, number of agents 1000, number of iterations per agent 300,
fraction of anti-conformists 0.05, kinetic factor µ = 0.1. Let us remind here
for the sake of comparison that the int( 1
u
) rule predicts 3 clusters at opinions
-0.66, 0 and 0.66 in the absence of anti-conformists.
7This simple implementation does not cause any practical problem for opinion values
close to zero since anti-conformists move away very soon from the average as observed in
figures 5 and 7.
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Figure 5: Time evolution of opinions for 0.3 uncertainty level, δ = 2, µ = 0.1
and equal chances for opinion expression for conformists (in red) and anti-
conformists (in green). Anti-conformists move to the border of the distri-
bution in a few tens steps and maintain their position at the border until
convergence of conformists is achieved.
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Figure 6: Histogram of asymptotic opinions after 300 iterations per individ-
ual for 0.3 uncertainty level, δ = 2, µ = 0.1 and equal chances for opin-
ion expression for conformists (in red) and anti-conformists (in green) (the
same simulation condition as in figure 5). Apart from the presence of anti-
conformists at the extreme of the distribution, the position of conformists
differs little from the int( 1
u
) rule prediction, -0.66 and +0.66.
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As a preliminary conclusion, the presence of 5 percent anti-conformists in
the population does not modify the distribution of conformists opinion when
anti-conformists have the same level of opinion expression as conformists (fig.
5 and 6).
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Figure 7: Time evolution of opinions for 0.3 uncertainty level, δ = 2, µ = 0.1
when anti-conformists (in green) express their views 20 times more often
than conformists (in red). We now observes 4 clusters instead of 3 with quite
different positions. Anti-conformists have attracted two clusters to more
extreme positions around -1 and +1 and the rest of the conformists have
now moved closer to the center.
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Figure 8: Histogram of asymptotic opinions for 0.3 uncertainty level, δ = 2,
µ = 0.1 , when anti-conformists (in green) express their views 20 times more
often than conformists (in red). We now observes 4 clusters instead of 3
with quite different positions. Anti-conformists have attracted two clusters
to more extreme positions around -1 and +1 and the rest of the conformists
have now moved closer to the center.
However as one can observe on the next couple of figures 7 and 8, anti-
conformists strongly influence the distribution of conformist opinions when
anti-conformists express their views 20 times more often than conformists.
Figure 7 shows that interaction among conformists make them converge into 4
clusters. The respective positions of conformists and anti-conformists clusters
results from their mutual interaction: anti-conformists first aggregate outside
conformists, but later, after conformists aggregation, the anti-conformists
have a reverse motion towards the closest conformists’ cluster, symmetrical
to the motion of the extreme conformist cluster towards anticonformists.
Variability of asymptotic clusters As a matter of fact, several tri-
als with different random sampling give qualitatively equivalent results: the
presence of a few outspoken anti-conformist (with f = 20) changes the at-
tractors of opinion dynamics from three clusters to two center clusters + two
16
extreme clusters; but the cluster positions and amplitude might change no-
ticeably between simulations with different random samplings for the same
set of parameters. Such instabilities are well known in random processes
such as Polya urns or Chinese restaurant process (Johnson & Kotz (1977)).
In the case of Polya urns, a coloured ball is randomly drawn from the urn and
two balls of the same colour are then replaced in the urn. When the initial
number of balls is small, say one red ball and one black ball, the proportion
of late samplings is strongly dependent upon the first occurring draws and
is thus susceptible of large fluctuations. We are precisely in a similar case,
since the initial opinions and sampling of the 50 anti-conformist have a strong
influence on the outcome of the dynamics. This phenomenon is a particular
instance of the path dependence phenomenon observed in non-linear and ran-
dom processes (Arthur (1994); Nelson & Winter (1982)). Path dependence
reflects the influence of history, which importance in politics is not a surprise
to political scientists.
We therefore performed 100 simulations per set of parameters and display
the results as histograms. In the next 3 figures, red histograms correspond
to conformist opinions at the end of the simulation and green histograms
correspond to anti-conformist opinions. The blue histograms corresponding
to simulations in the absence of anti-conformist are shown for the sake of
comparison. Common simulation parameters are anti-conformism strength
parameter δ = 2, number of agents 1000, number of iterations per agent 3000,
fraction of anti-conformist 0.05, kinetic factor µ = 0.1 and multiplicative fre-
quency factor of anti-conformist f = 20. They only differ by the uncertainty
levels: u = 0.3, 0.4, 0.6.
The 3 figures confirm that large levels of expression by anti-conformists
allow them to drag significant fractions of conformists towards the two emer-
gent extreme clusters, with some variability in positions and relative am-
plitude. The influence of anti-conformists increases the number of clusters
composed of conformists by (at least) one; two extreme clusters have opinions
aligned with those of anti-conformists, while the remaining cluster(s) (which
can be 0, 1 or 2) are centered closer to the original opinion average8.
The following simple argument explains the increase in the number of
8 A word of caution: such histograms could be interpreted either as histograms of the
positions of single isolated peaks as observed in figures 5 and 7, or as the aggregation of
wider peaks. We confirm that only the first interpretation is correct from many direct
observations of asymptotic histograms of single iteration processes. Furthermore, wide
peaks would not be stable under the bounded confidence process.
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Figure 9: Histograms of opinions averaged over 100 runs after 3000 iterations
per individual. 0.6 uncertainty level. The red (resp. green) histograms are
for conformists (resp. anti-conformists) and the blue histogram was obtained
for conformists in the absence of anti-conformists.
clusters due to the influence of the anti-conformist agents. Two extreme
conformist clusters of initial width u are attracted by the anti-conformists.
They don’t participate in the formation of the central clusters. The “effec-
tive” width wc of initial segment of conformists which end up in the central
clusters is then reduced to 2 − 2u, instead of 2. Applying the n = int(wc
2u
)
rule to the number nc of central clusters gives nc = int(
1−u
u
). The predicted
total number of clusters is then:
n = 2 + int(
1− u
u
) (4)
A comparison with simulation results gives:
uncertainty predicted clusters’ number observed number
.6 2 2
.4 3 3
.3 4 5 with overlap
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Figure 10: Histograms of opinions averaged over 100 runs after 3000 itera-
tions per individual. 0.4 uncertainty level. The red (resp. green) histograms
are for conformists (resp. anti-conformists) and the blue histogram was ob-
tained for conformists in the absence of anti-conformists.
19
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5  0  0.5  1  1.5  2
n
b 
of
 o
pi
ni
on
s
opinion
tol 0.3, ext. fraction 0.05, freq 20, 1000 ag, 3000 iter per ag
conformists
anti-conformists
without anti-conformists
Figure 11: Histograms of opinions averaged over 100 runs after 3000 itera-
tions per individual. 0.3 uncertainty level. The red (resp. green) histograms
are for conformists (resp. anti-conformists) and the blue histogram was ob-
tained for conformists in the absence of anti-conformists.
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Checking the path dependency Because the earlier steps of the dynam-
ics are so important, we might expect that anti-conformists have a stronger
influence if they step in earlier rather than later. In the next two sets of
simulations, the frequency factor f was either decreased or increased linearly
in time between 1 and 20, for the same set of parameters as in figure 10.
One can check that the red histogram taken for decreasing f from 20 to 1
is nearly the same as the red one on figure 10, obtained in the presence of 5
perc. anti-conformists with relative expression frequency 20, while the green
one for increasing f from 1 to 20 is nearly the same as the blue one (obtained
in the absence of anti-conformist) on figure 10. In other words, the early ex-
pression of extremist views determines the outcome of the process, while late
expression has nearly no effect.
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Figure 12: Histograms of conformist opinions after 3000 iterations per in-
dividual. 0.4 uncertainty level. The red histogram correspond to decreasing
the anti-conformist expression frequency, the green one to its increase.
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The consensus regime For larger uncertainty values, such as u = 0.9,
the situation changes dramatically. Single runs show that there remains only
one cluster of conformists at the same position as the anti-conformist cluster;
consensus is restored. But a more systematic survey running 300 simulations
per set of parameters shows on figure 13 that the position of the single cluster
varies widely along the opinion axis; furthermore, no peak structure similar to
those observed at lower uncertainties is apparent on the histogram of clusters.
The vertical bars of the histogram are the number of opinions divided by the
number of conformist agents. Except for a small region in the neighbourhood
of opinion 0.0, the height of the peaks are integer values, indicating that for
each simulation, all opinions are concentrated in one single cluster. A first
tentative explanation for randomness of the cluster position rests on the faster
dynamics at larger u values: nearly all pair samplings satisfy the confidence
condition for interaction, and convergence is then faster, as we checked on
time plots (not represented). We have earlier seen that faster convergence
yields more sensitivity to the early steps of the dynamics and more dispersion
of the asymptotic results.
Obtaining a consensus for u = 0.9 is in accordance with the int(1/u)
rule of the bounded confidence model; but the standard bounded confidence
model yields a consensus attractor close to the center of gravity of the initial
distribution, which is quite different from the present result: the consensus
peaks seem randomly located on the [-1,+1] opinion axis.
Our results also differ from those of the extremism model of Deffuant et al.
(2002) who predict clusters located close to the anti-conformist initial posi-
tions i.e -1 or +1, for large values of u ( in accordance to their hypotheses
of quasi-fixed position of anti-conformist at -1 or +1). By contrast, for large
values of u, in our present model, the position of anti-conformist initially
scattered over the entire [−1,+1] segment results largely from the earlier
iteration steps and can undergo large fluctuations.
The transition between single cluster dynamics at larger u and two clus-
ters dynamics at lower u is smooth; it is a crossover rather than a sharp tran-
sition and occurs around u = 0.8. At u = 0.8 the histogram (fig 14) displays
co-occurrence of bins with integer values corresponding to single clusters and
of bins with non-integer values clustered in two wide peaks around ±0.66.
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Figure 13: Histogram of conformist agents asymptotic opinions for a 0.8
uncertainty level based on 300 simulations. The vertical bars are the number
of opinions divided by the number of conformist agents. 30000 iterations
per individual for a 0.9 uncertainty level. Except for a small region in the
neighbourhood of opinion 0.0, the height of the bins are integer values, 1 ,2
or 3 indicating that for each simulation, all opinions are concentrated in one
single cluster
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Figure 14: Histogram of conformist agents asymptotic opinions for a 0.8
uncertainty level based on 300 simulations. 3000 iterations per individual
for a 0.8 uncertainty level, corresponding to the transition. The bins are a
mixture of integer values 1 and 2, plus two wide peaks around ±0.66
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Influence of simulation parameters In order to study the influence of
the different parameters r, f, u, µ and δ on the outcome of opinion dynamics,
one has to compress the information in the histograms by monitoring some
of their characteristics. We have chosen to monitor the characteristics of the
positive ’extreme’ peak, the rightmost peak9 observed on figures 9, 10, 11. We
monitored the fraction of opinions in the peak (i.e how many conformists were
attracted by the rightmost anti-conformists), their average deviation (how
far from the initial average 0 they were attracted), the standard deviation
of the distribution of opinions in the peak10, and finally the product of the
average times the fraction11 . This latest quantity measures some kind of
“attractiveness”. We shall see that this attractiveness often (but not always
as further discussed) displays relatively little variation, corresponding to a
balance between how many conformists are attracted by anti-conformists and
how far they are attracted.
The present systematic investigation of the role of simulation parameters
is limited to the lower values12 of u, in the multiple clusters regime.
Applying this method to the influence of uncertainty u one obtains
the following graph (fig.15), some points (u = 0.3, 0.4, 0.6) of which can be
checked against the histograms on fig. 9, 10 and 11. The linear increase
with u of the fraction of agents attracted to the extreme peak is simply
understood from the width of the conformist’s zone under the influence of
the anti-conformist: since anti-conformist move early to the upper boundary
of the conformist cluster they can at most influence a fraction u of them. The
simulated results give fractions of 0.227 for u = 0.3, 0.33 for u = 0.4 and 0.43
for u = 0.6, not far away from the u upper-bound. But the attracted fraction
saturates close to 0.5 at larger u values, when the two extremist clusters are
9Isolating the rightmost peak for these measurements was done by checking the his-
tograms for a gap left of the peak and taking measurements on the remaining bins right
of the gap; for figure 10 e.g., the empty bin at 0.65 opinion can be used to start collecting
the statistics.
10 These three quantities correspond to standard measurements of peak characteristics
in spectra, the area under the peak (fraction), the peak position with respect to the origin
(average deviation), and the peak width (twice the standard deviation). For figure 10 e.g.
the fraction of opinions in the righmost peak is 33 perc., the average position is 0.91 and
the standard deviation 0.10.
11In the next five figures, the fraction of opinions, the standard deviation and the at-
tractiveness are given by the scale on the left, in red, and the average deviation by the
scale on the right, in green.
12larger values of u were previously investigated in the section on the consensus regime.
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Figure 15: Variations of the rightmost peak characteristics with uncertainty
u. The fraction of opinions, the standard deviation and the attractiveness
are given by the scale on the left, in red, and the average deviation by the
scale on the right, in green. When uncertainty increases from u = 0.3, to
u = 0.7, the fraction of attracted conformists (the red crosses) increases up to
values (0.47) corresponding to a near depletion of the central peak(s) where
only 6 perc. of the population remains; most conformists became extremists.
Average opinion (green crosses) of the extreme peak decreases to 0.8 and its
standard deviation increases.
competing.
Increasing the fraction r of anti-conformist (fig. 16) and their relative
frequency of intervention f (fig. 17) increases the average deviation of
the peak from 0. The ratio of biased moves of conformists towards anti-
conformists to their converging moves obtained from the tree of probabilities
(figure 4) is rf
1−r
This ratio increases with both r and f , and so does the
average deviation of the peak.
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Figure 16: Variations of the rightmost peak characteristics with r the frac-
tion of anti-conformists. The fraction of opinions, the standard deviation and
the attractiveness are given by the scale on the left, in red, and the average
deviation by the scale on the right, in green.
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Figure 17: Variations of the rightmost peak characteristics with f the
multiplicative factor of interactions with anti-conformist. The fraction of
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in green.
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µ is a priori a simple kinetic parameter which increase reduces the
convergence time. For instance, a value of 0.5 was generally considered as
optimal in bounded confidence models since it implies the full agreement
between a pair of agents on the middle position in one single iteration. But
as observed with this plot (fig. 18), µ also influences the peak characteristics.
When convergence is fast, the initial steps of the iteration process have an
even stronger influence on the outcome of the dynamics - see for instance
the dramatic increase of the standard deviation of the rightmost peak when
µ = 0.4. A technical conclusion is that in order to avoid strong sampling
variations, opinion dynamics models should be run with values of µ ≤ 0.25.
This is anyway compatible with the fact that in real life several interactions
are necessary to significantly change opinions.
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Figure 18: Variations of the rightmost peak characteristics with µ the
kinetic factor. The fraction of opinions, the standard deviation and the
attractiveness are given by the scale on the left, in red, and the average
deviation by the scale on the right, in green.
The variations of the rightmost peak characteristics with δ the anti-
conformism intensity are non-monotonic. When δ increases from 1.5 to
2.6, the average deviation increases, which is a direct consequence of equation
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Figure 19: Variations of the rightmost peak characteristics with δ the anti-
conformism intensity. When δ starts increasing from δ = 1, the conformists
are attracted to more extremism (the green points). But when δ = 2.6 a
regime changes occurs as observed on all four monitored quantities: extrem-
ists’ fraction (red crosses) and attractiveness (pink squares) decrease, and
they start loosing followers (red crosses). The strong increase of the stan-
dard deviation around δ = 2.6 is also a clue of the regime transition.
(2). But it reaches a maximum around δ = 2.6. The change of slopes of
the average deviation, of the fraction of conformists in the peak and of the
attractiveness curves, as the strong increase of the standard deviation are
evidences of a regime transition around δ = 2.6
To observe the transition region in detail (fig. 20), we came back to indi-
vidual asymptotic histograms similar to figures 6 and 8. One notices that be-
fore the transition, at δ = 2.4 the leftmost and rightmost peaks of conformists
histograms (in red) occur at the same opinion values as anti-conformist his-
togram peaks (in green). For higher values of δ the anti-conformist peaks
are outside the leftmost and rightmost conformists peaks. In other words,
the anti-conformists became unable to drag anymore the conformists to their
position.
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Since larger values of conformists uncertainty u make them more sus-
ceptible to the influence of anti-conformists, the stalling transition value δs
increases with u: we observed a transition at δs = 2.5 when u = 0.3, at
δs = 2.8 when u = 0.4 and at δs = 3.2 when u = 0.6.
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Figure 20: The stalling transition: asymptotic opinion histograms for δ =
2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7. The red (resp. green) histograms are for conformists (resp.
anti-conformists). Extreme peaks coincide in position at δ = 2.4, but they
start diverging at δ = 2.5
To summarise on “Attractiveness”, it displays relatively small variations
with r, f and µ, reflecting a rough balance13 between how many conformists
are attracted toward extremism and how far. The same relative stability is
observed with respect to δ until δ = 2.5. Attractiveness decays when δ > 2.5
and this is an indication of a change in dynamical regime: anti-conformists
lost their strong influence on conformists. The increase in “attractiveness”
with conformists’s uncertainty u also reflects the series of transitions in the
number of clusters with u.
13we can only conjecture about this balance, but we have no explanation for it, nor
why changes in attractiveness or its derivatives goes along with transitions in dynamical
regimes.
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4 Discussion and conclusions
Let us first summarise our results.
• Anti-conformism of small fraction of the agents population can result
in the emergence of large extremist clusters, provided that the anti-
conformists express more often their views than conformists.
• This influence exists whatever conformist uncertainty, and it is larger
when uncertainty increases. Two distinct dynamical regimes are ob-
served according to the value of uncertainty. For lower values, anti-
conformists drag important fractions of conformist agents to their own
extreme position. For higher values of uncertainty, consensus is re-
stored, but along a much wider range of positions which can be centered
far away from the initial center of gravity of initial opinions.
• Obviously the anti-conformist influence increases with their number
and the frequency of their interventions. By contrast, one observes a
transition in the anti-conformist influence when anti-conformists posi-
tion themselves too far away from the center; they then loose influence
and are unable to drag large fractions of conformists.
• Early intervention of anti-conformists increases their influence. And
the early steps of the dynamics are responsible for the large deviations
in peak positions.
• The results concerning the number of peaks in the opinion distribution
as a function of the uncertainty parameter and their approximate po-
sition are robust. The exact position of the peak cannot be predicted
accurately, due to the susceptibility of the probabilistic dynamics to
initial samplings.
Let us now discuss how these conclusions would eventually be modified by
the other players in the political game, media, parties, and other institutions
such as elections, government etc.
In fact, media and political parties re-enforce the influence of non-conformists.
Journals, newspapers or television compete for readership and audience.
Journalists fight for impact, notoriety and reputation. In this market for
information, or cognitive market as proposed by Bronner (2013), the moti-
vations are the same as for anti-conformists of Smaldino & Epstein (2015).
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Impact is achieved by taking simple, extreme and fast positions. The ten-
dency is increased by the use of Internet, from which journalists often take
their views. The fast communication procedures on Social Networks also
favour the extremes as observed on tweets and readers reaction to articles
in the press. To maximise audience, societal and political debates on the
television are dramatised: they oppose extreme views and seldom result in
consensus. As a matter of fact, the media contribute largely to the high
value of the relative frequency factor f used in our simulations. In that re-
spect, the growing role of the media and especially of the Internet will not
automatically lead to a better understanding of challenges and options, but
might on the contrary favour the expression of extremist views.
The same mechanisms can be observed during the political debate inside
parties, before elections. Party members are competing to get positions inside
the party or to represent the party in future elections. They also want to
make clear that they are faithful to their party by strongly opposing other
parties views. For them too, a simple ideological position is easier to express
and to defend, than balancing between the contradictory constraints faced
in the choice of a policy adapted to societal challenges.
So both media and political parties internal discussions re-reinforce the
influence of extremists.
The dynamics might be different during elections and at the government
level. On the occasion of national elections for instance, parties have to adapt
their program to the electorate and make alliances to win support. In prin-
ciple they should move towards the center for this. But when the electorate
comprises strong extremist clusters, as often observed in our simulations,
they have a choice to position themselves clearly on one side of the political
checkers, especially under the influence of their members which are biased
with respect to the ’rational’ position of optimising support from the general
population.
The government itself has to navigate between general support and the
support from inside the parties of the alliance which brought it in power.
In conclusion of the present discussion, the dynamical processes inside
the media and the parties are in agreement with our hypothesis of a stronger
expression of anti-conformist positions. This re-enforce the conclusions of
our model.
On the other hand, other aspects of politics concerning general elections
or government positions necessitate further analysis.
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What we tried to demonstrate is that evolution towards extremism does
not automatically imply coercion, strategic plots or the control of the media
by a single agent. Simple human cognitive processes such as anti-conformism,
cognitive biases and uncertainty of agents can favour its emergence and its
influence on the constituency.
The results of our simulations were interpreted in terms of politics, but
they could also provide some insight into other social phenomena involving
the dynamics of extreme choices:
• In markets of luxury goods: for instance, why do people buy fast cars
or SUV vehicles when they have little use for these products? How is
the market driven by these extreme choices?
• in Fashion and in the Arts, where anti-conformism is the rule driving
the perpetual motion of expressed realisations;
• in the propagation of imaginary dangers related to new technologies in
the media and the Internet (Bronner (2013)).
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